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Abstract—We revisit the 3-pass code-based identification scheme
proposed by Stern at Crypto’93, and give a new 5-pass protocol
for which the probability of the cheater is ≈ 1/2 (instead of 2/3
in the original Stern’s proposal). Furthermore, we propose to use
quasi-cyclic construction in order to dramatically reduce the size
of the public key.
The proposed scheme is zero-knowledge and relies on an NP-
complete problem coming from coding theory (namely the q-ary
Syndrome Decoding problem). Taking into account a recent study
of a generalization of Stern’s information-set-decoding algorithm
for decoding linear codes over arbitrary finite fields Fq, we suggest
parameters so that the public key be 34Kbits while those of
Stern’s scheme is about 66Kbits. This provides a very practical
identification (and possibly signature) scheme which is mostly
attractive for light-weight cryptography.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cryptosystem based on number-theory (problems of factori-
sation and discrete logarithm) is more and more widely used
in the real world. After Shor’s algorithm which describes a
quantum algorithm to solve in polynomial time the two previ-
ous problems, there is a strong need for public key schemes
which are not based on such problems. Firstly because it would
be unreasonable to consider only one type of hard problem. At
the time, nearly all public key cryptographic products are based
on integer factorization or discrete logarithm. Secondly, even if
the above mentioned problems remain hard, practical progress
in factorization and discrete logarithm computation leads to
choose larger and larger keys.
The Shor’s algorithm doesn’t threaten the so-called post-
quantum cryptosystems as lattice-based, code-based, and
multivariate-based cryptosystems.
In this paper, we consider a particular type of alternative
cryptography, based on error-correcting code theory. Code-
based cryptography was initiated a long time ago with the
celebrated McEliece encryption algorithm.
Public key identification (ID) protocols allow a party holding
a secret key to prove its identity to any other entity holding
the corresponding public key. The minimum security of such
protocols should be that a passive observer who sees the inter-
action should not then be able to perform his own interaction
and successfully impersonate the prover.
At Crypto’93, Stern proposed a new scheme, which is still
today the reference in this area [18]. The Stern’s scheme is
a multiple round zero-knowledge protocol, where each round
is a three-pass interaction between the prover and the verifier.
Stern’ scheme has two major drawbacks :
1) many rounds are required because the cheater suc-
cess probability is 2/3 instead of 1/2 for Fiat-Shamir’s
factorization-based protocol [8], hence typically 27
rounds are needed so that this probability be less than
2−16,
2) the public key is very large, typically 66 Kbits.
The first issue was addressed by Gaborit and Girault in [10]
and the second one was partially adressed by Véron [20]. In
this paper, we focus on the first drawback. Using q-ary codes
instead of binary ones, we define a 5 pass identification scheme
for which the probability of a cheater is bounded by 1/2. We
then propose to use quasi-cyclic construction to address the
second drawback.
Organisation of the paper
In Section II, we give basics facts about code-based cryp-
tography, we describe the original Stern’s scheme and propose
in Section III a new identification scheme which permits to
reduce the number of rounds involved during the identification
process. In Section IV, we describe the properties of our
proposal and study its security. The Section V concludes our
contribution.
II. CODE-BASED CRYPTOGRAPHY
In this section we recall basic facts about code-based cryp-
tography. We refer to [4], for a general introduction to these
problems.
A. Definitions
Linear codes are k-dimensional subspaces of an n-
dimensional vector space over a finite field Fq , where k and
n are positive integers with k < n, and q is a prime power.
The error-correcting capability of such a code is the maximum
number t of errors that the code is able to decode. In short,
linear codes with these parameters are denoted (n, k, t)-codes.
Definition II.1 (Hamming weight) The (Hamming) weight of
a vector x is the number of non-zero entries. We use wt(x) to
represent the Hamming weight of x.
Definition II.2 (Generator and Parity Check Matrix) Let
C be a linear code over Fq . A generator matrix G of C is a
matrix whose rows form a basis of C :
C = {xG : x ∈ Fkq}.
A parity check matrix H of C is defined by
C = {x ∈ Fnq : Hx
T = 0}
and generates the dual space of C .
We describe here the main hard problems on which are based
the code-based cryptosystems.
Let n and r be two integers such that n ≥ r,Binary(n, r) (resp.
q− ary(n, r)) be the set of binary (resp. q-ary) matrices with
n columns and r rows of rank r. Moreover, let us denote by
x
R
← A, the fact that x is randomly selected in the set A.
Definition II.3 (binary Syndrome Decoding (SD) problem)
Input : H R← Binary(n, r), y R← Fr2 and an integer
ω > 0.
Ouput : A word s ∈ Fn2 such that wt(s) ≤ ω, HsT = y.
This problem was proven to be NP-complete in 1978 [3], but
only for binary codes.
Definition II.4 (q-ary Syndrome Decoding (qSD) problem)
Input : H R← q− ary(n, r), y R← Frq and an integer
ω > 0.
Ouput : A word s ∈ Fnq such that wt(s) ≤ ω, HsT = y.
In 1994, A. Barg proved that this result holds for codes over
all finite fields [1, in russian].
The problems which cryptographic applications rely upon
can have different numbers of solutions. For example, public
key encryption schemes usually have exactly one solution,
while digital signatures often have more than one possible
solution. For code-based cryptosystems, the uniqueness of
solutions can be expressed by the Gilbert-Varshamov (GV)
bound :
Definition II.5 (q-ary Gilbert-Varshamov bound)
Let Hq(x) be the q-ary entropy function, given by :
Hq(x) = x ˙logq(q − 1)− x
˙logqx− (1− x)
˙logq(1− x).
Suppose 0 ≤ δ ≤ (q − 1)/q. Then there exists an infinite
sequence of (n, k, d) q-ary linear codes with d/n = δ and
rate R = k/n satisfying the inequality :
R ≥ 1−Hq(δ) ∀n.
B. SD identification schemes
Stern’s scheme is the first practical zero-knowledge
identification scheme based on the Syndrome Decoding
problem [18]. The scheme uses a binary (n−k)×n matrix H
common to all users. If H is chosen randomly, it will provide
a parity check matrix for a code with asymptotically good
minimum distance given by the (binary) Gilbert-Varshamov
(GV) bound. The private key for a user will thus be a word
s of low weight wt(s) = ω (with H2(ω) ≈ 1 − k/n), which
sums up to the syndrome HsT = y, the public key. By
Stern’s 3-pass zero-knowledge protocol, the secret key holder
can prove his knowledge of s using two blending factors:
a permutation and a random vector. However, a dishonest
prover not knowing s can cheat the verifier in the protocol
with probability 2/3. Thus, the protocol has to be run several
times to detect cheating provers. The security of the scheme
relies on the difficulty of the general decoding problem, that is
on the difficulty of determining the preimage s of y = HsT .
As mentioned in [3], the SD problem, stated in terms of
generator matrix is also NP-complete since one can go from
the parity-check to the generator matrix (or vice-versa) in
polynomial time. In [20], the author uses a generator matrix of
a random linear binary as the public key and defines this way
a dual version of Stern’s scheme in order to obtain, among
other things, an improvement of the transmission rate.
Figure 1 sums up the performances of the two 3-pass SD
identification schemes for a probability of cheating bounded
by 10−6. The computation complexity is the number of bits
operation involved by the protocol and the communication
complexity the number of exchanged bits.
SD G-SD
Rounds 35 35
Public data (bits) 66048 66816
Computation complexity 222.13 222.5
Communication complexity 40133 34160
Fig. 1. Performances of SD schemes
C. Attacks
For SD identification schemes, since the matrix used is
a random one, the cryptanalyst is faced to the problem of
decoding a random binary linear code. There are two main
families of algorithms to solve this problem : Information Set
Decoding (ISD) and (Generalized) Birthday Algorithm (GBA).
The Information-Set-Decoding Attack seems to have the lowest
complexity.
One tries to recover the k information symbols as follows :
the first step is to pick k of the n coordinates randomly in the
hope that all of them are errors free. Try then to recover the
message by solving a k× k linear system (binary or over Fq).
In [15], the author presents a generalization of Stern’s
information-set-decoding algorithm from [17] for decoding
linear codes over arbitrary finite fields Fq and analyzes the
complexity. We will choose our parameters with regards to the
complexity of this attack.
III. A NEW IDENTIFICATION SCHEME
In what follows, we consider an element of Fnq as n blocs
of size ⌈log2(q)⌉ = N . We represent each element of Fq as
N bits. We first introduce a special transformation that we will
use in our protocol.
Definition III.1 Let Σ be a permutation of {1, . . . , n} and
γ = (γ1, . . . , γn) ∈ F
n
q such that ∀i, γi 6= 0. We define the
transformation Πγ,Σ as :
Πγ,Σ : F
n
q −→ F
n
q
v 7→ (γΣ(1)vΣ(1), . . . , γΣ(n)vΣ(n))
Notice that ∀α ∈ Fq , ∀v ∈ Fnq ,
Πγ,Σ(αv) = αΠγ,Σ(v) and wt(Πγ,Σ(v)) = wt(v).
A. Key generation
Let r = n−k, the scheme uses a random (r×n) q-ary matrix
H common to all users. It can be considered as the parity
check matrix of a random linear (n, k) q-ary code. Without
loss of generality, we can assume that H is given under the
form H = (Ir|M) where M is a random r × r matrix, since
it is well known that a Gaussian elimination doesn’t change
the code generated by H . Let κ be the security parameter,
algorithm 1 describes the key generation process.
Algorithm 1 Key generation(1κ)
⊲ Choose n, k, ω and q such that WFISD(n, r, ω, q) ≥ 2κ
⊲ Randomly pick a (r × n) q-ary matrix H.
⊲ Randomly pick s ∈ Fnq with wt(s) = ω.
⊲ Compute y such that HsT = y.
⊲ Output : pk = (H,y, ω) and sk = s.
B. Identification
The secret key holder can prove his knowledge of s using
two blending factors: the transformation above mentionned and
a random vector. However, a dishonest prover not knowing s
can cheat the verifier in the protocol with probability ≈ 1/2.
Thus, the protocol has to be run several times to detect cheating
provers. The security of the scheme relies on the difficulty
of the general decoding problem, that is on the difficulty of
determining the preimage s of y = HsT .
This protocol is repeated δ times. A cheater has, once c1
and c2 sent, to be able to answer to 2q possible questions. If
he is only able to answer to q+2 questions then he is able to
find a solution to the problem. Indeed, let us denote by z the
value sent when b = 1, for c1 and c2 fixed, this means that
there exist α and α′ distinct and β and β′ such that :
HΠ−1γ,Σ(β)
T − αy = HΠ−1γ,Σ(β
′)T − α′y
β − αz = β′ − α′z
Algorithm 2 Identification Scheme
Private key, sk: s ∈ Fnq such that HsT = y and wt(s) =
ω.
Public key, pk: H a (n− k × n) random matrix of rank
n− k over Fq, h a collision resistance hash function, y ∈
F
n−k
q and ω ∈ N
⊲ Prover: generates a vector u ∈ Fnq , a vector γ ∈ Fnq∗ and
a permutation Σ over {1, . . . , n} at random and computes
the commitments :
1: Set c1 ← h
(
Σ, γ,HuT
)
2: Set c2 ← h (Πγ,Σ(u),Πγ,Σ(s))
3: Sends the commitments {c1, c2} to the Verifier.
⊲ Verifier: chooses a random α ∈ Fq and sends it to the
Prover.
⊲ Prover: sends Πγ,Σ(u+ αs) = β ∈ Fnq to the Verifier.
⊲ Verifier: sends a challenge b ∈ {0, 1} to the Prover.
⊲ Prover: answers the challenge
4: if b = 0 then reveals Σ and γ.
5: else if b = 1 then reveals Πγ,Σ(s).
6: end if
⊲ Verifier: checks commitment correctness
7: if b = 0 then checks if c1 = h(Σ, γ,HΠ−1γ,Σ(β)
T − αy)
is correct
8: else if b = 1 then checks if c2 = h(β −
αΠγ,Σ(s),Πγ,Σ(s)) is correct and if wt(Πγ,Σ(s)) = ω.
9: end if
with wt(z) = ω. Which gives β − β′ = (α − α′)z and
HΠ−1γ,Σ(β−β
′)T = (α−α′)y. We then deduce HΠ−1γ,Σ(z)
T =
y and wt(Π−1γ,Σ(z)) = wt(z) = ω.
Hence the success probability of a cheater is bounded by
q+1
2q
.
C. Signature
By using the so-called Fiat-Shamir paradigm [8], it is
theoretically possible to convert this protocol into a signature
scheme, even if it is practically questionable, since the signa-
ture is large.
IV. PROPERTIES AND SECURITY OF THE SCHEME
A. Zero-knowledge
Let I = (H,y, ω) be the public data shared by the prover
and the verifier and let P (I, s) be the following predicate :
P (I, s) = “s is a vector which satisfies HsT = y,wt(s) =
ω” then :
Proposition IV.1 The protocol is an interactive proof of
knowledge for P (I, s).
Due to the limited size of this paper we don’t detail this
proposition here.
Theorem IV.1 The protocol is a zero-knowledge interactive
proof for P (I, s) in the random oracle model.
We will detail this theorem in a longer version of this article.
However, notice that because of the randomness of u and α
only random values are exchanged during the protocol.
B. Security and Parameters
Like binaries SD identification schemes, security of our
scheme relies on three properties of random linear q-ary codes :
1) Random linear codes satisfy the q-ary Gilbert-Varshamov
lower bound [11];
2) For large n almost all linear codes lie over the Gilbert-
Varshamov bound [16];
3) Solving the q-ary syndrome decoding problem for ran-
dom codes is NP-complete [1].
Now taking into account the bounds on the workfactor of the
Information Set Decoding algorithm over Fq given in [14]
(and which generalizes the bounds given in [9]) we have
to set up parameters in order to obtain a practical scheme
with a security level greater or equal than 280. We have then
to choose the number of rounds in order to minimize the
probability of success of a cheater.
Since we deal with random codes, we have to select
parameters with respect to the Gilbert-Varshamov bound (see
Definition II.5), i.e. choose a weight ω with respect to this
bound. Moreover as usual we will now suppose k = r = n/2.
Let N be the number of bits needed to encode an element
of Fq, ℓh the output size of the hash function h, ℓΣ (resp.
ℓγ ) the size of the seed used to generate the permutation Σ
(resp. the vector γ) and δ the number of rounds. We have the
following properties for our scheme :
Size of the public data in bits :
k × k ×N + nN (we use the systematic form of H)
Total number of bits exchanged :
δ(2ℓh +N + nN + 1 + (ℓΣ + ℓγ + nN)/2)
Computation complexity over Fq :
δ(k + n+ 2wt(s) multiplications + k + wt(s) additions)
To obtain a precise complexity on the workfactor of
ISD algorithms over Fq we’ve used the code developped
by C. Peters which estimates (using a Markov chain
implementation) the number of iterations of the best algorithm
for an attack using all possible known tricks [15]. ISD
algorithms depend on a set of parameters and this code allows
to test which ones can minimize the complexity of the attack.
We suggest to use for our scheme :
q = 256, n = 128, k = 64,wt(s) = 49.
The complexity of an attack using ISD algorithms is then at
least 287. For the same security level in SD schemes, we need
to take n = 700, k = 350,wt(s) = 75. Table 2 sums up the
characteristics of our scheme and those of SD schemes for a
same level of security and a probability of cheating of 2−16.
We considered that all seeds used are of length 128.
SD G-SD Our scheme
Rounds 27 27 16
Public data (bits) 123200 124250 33792
Communication (bits) 37872 31572 30848
Computation 222.7 223.1 212.1mult+
(bits. op) (bits. op) 211.3add
(bytes op.)
Fig. 2. SD schemes vs. q-ary SD scheme
To obtain a security level of 2128 suggested parameters are
q = 256, n = 208, k = 104,wt(s) = 78
which gives a scheme with the following properties :
Rounds : 16
Public data (bits) : 88192
Communication (bits) : 46224
Computation (bytes op.) : 212.9mult. and 211.5add.
Notice that in [18], Stern has proposed two 5 pass variant
of his scheme : one to minimize the computing load and the
other one to lower the number of rounds. However, for these
two variants, the size of the public data and the communication
complexity are greater than the one of our scheme . A precise
comparison for the computation complexity will be made in a
longer version of this paper.
C. Reducing public key size
1) Quasi-cyclic construction: In [10], the authors propose
a variation of the Stern identification scheme by using double
circulant codes. The circulant structure of the public matrix
makes the computation very easy without having to generate
the whole binary matrix, indeed the whole scheme only needs
very few memory storage. They propose a scheme with a public
key of size 347 bits and a private key of size 694 bits.
We can use this construction in our context by replacing the
random q-ary matrix H by a random q-ary double circulant
matrix.
2) Quasi-dyadic construction: We can also imagine a con-
struction based on quasi-dyadic codes as proposed in [13].
Recently several new structural attacks appeared in [19] and
[7] that extract the private key of some parameters of the
variants presented in [2] and [13]. But in our context we deal
with random codes and we are threaten by this kind of attacks.
Furthermore in [6] the authors describe a secure implemen-
tation of the Stern scheme using quasi-circulant codes. Our
proposal inherits of the good properties of the original Stern
scheme face to leakage of information as SPA and DPA attacks.
The parameters using quasi-cyclic or quasi-dyadic randoms
codes are q = 256, n = 128, k = 64,wt(s) = 49 this gives a
public key of 512 bits and a private key of 1024 bits for almost
the same complexity for an ISD attack.
3) Embedding the secret in the matrix: In fact it is possible
to still decrease the sizes obtained in the previous subsection.
The idea (from [10]) consists in embedding the secret key x
in the public matrix. To achieve that, we consider the secret as
a word of the dual code of the code generated by the public
matrix H. This means that we will use a null syndrom, which
does not change the zero-knowledge property. We will detail
this improvement in a longer version of this paper.
V. CONCLUSION
We have defined an identification scheme which among all
the schemes based on the SD problem has the best parameters
for the size of the public data as well as for the communication
complexity. Moreover, we have proposed a variant so as to
reduce the size of the public data.
The improvement proposed here to the Stern scheme can
be applied to all the Stern-based identification and signature
schemes (as identity-based identification and signature [5] or
threshold ring signature [12] for example).
We believe that this type of scheme is a realistic alternative
to the usual number theory identification schemes in the
case of constrained environments such as smart cards and of
applications such as Pay-TV or vending machines.
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